(1) p(B given A) = p{A8cB)lp (A) [providedp(A) * 0] is a consequence of a "fundamental law of probable belief (1926, p. 181) , not a definition of the left-hand side. I have professed scepticism about its being a definition in any philosophically illuminating (as opposed to mathematically convenient) sense (1995, p. 266) . Nevertheless, in §2 I shall defend those philosophers who take it as a definition by answering Lowe's objections. (Following Hilary Putnam (1962) , I do not attach much importance to whether a fundamental law of a theory be dignified (or demeaned) with the title "definition".) In §3 I expand on reasons (given before: 1995, pp. 269-70, 301-2) why Lowe's definition of conditional probability is not extensionally adequate. In §4 I defend Ramsey's idea (Adams' Thesis) against Lowe's criticisms.
Lowe focuses mainly on §5 of my survey article (1995) , the section entitled "Conditional Uncertainty". It will be helpful to review the place of that section in the overall plot: doing so may eliminate some misunderstanding. In the previous three sections, well-known proposals for the truth conditions of different kinds of conditionals were discussed. One kind of objection (among others) was raised for each proposal: that it has counterintuitive consequences for uncertain conditional judgements. For instance, if the truth-functional account were correct, we should often be much more certain in our conditional judgements than we are, for they should gain credibility from the likelihood that the antecedent is false. On the other hand, on a theory which requires some sort of "strong connection" between antecedent and consequent for the truth of a conditional, our conditional judgements should often be much less certain than they are. A simple numerical example: how likely is it that if the die lands an even number, it will land a six? Most people answer ' / 3 . On the truth-functional account of "if, the correct answer is 2 / 3 : four out of the six ways the die can land make the truth-functional conditional true. On a "strong connection" theory, the answer is zero: it's certainly false that if the die lands even, it will land six (see Lowe's §4) ; and what you are certain is false deserves zero probability. The plan of §5 was to face the issue of uncertainty directly-to turn to our best theory of uncertain judgements, which (idealizing away imprecision) gives them probabilistic structure. We discovered there, as an integral part of an established theory, the notion of conditional probability. I tried to explain this notion, as a going concern-as a working part of a working theory-to a readership which includes some who have not the benefit of a practical acquaintance with it. (Like any technical notion in logic, mathematics, science or philosophy, you come to understand it best by working with it, not by reading about it.) I tried to do this in a way which shows the plausibility of the hypothesis that uncertainty about conditional judgements matches judge-ments of conditional probability. I deferred until §6 the question whether a conditional probability may be construed as the probability of (the truth of) a proposition. What Lowe takes as vacillation or unclarity (p. 604), is studied neutrality: in §5 I do not say anything that requires that there be a proposition the probability of whose truth is a conditional probability, or anything which precludes this. That was my aim.
2 I did warn against some possible misinterpretations of the notion of conditional probability (p. 269). I said that it would be wrong to read "The probability of B given A is x" as (2) If A (is true), then the probability of B is x.
I showed that this would have the absurd consequence that all probabilities are 1 or 0. (p(A given A) = 1; p(A given -'A) = 0; read as above, together with the law of excluded middle, we would be able to derive that p(A) = 1 orp(A) = 0.) On this Lowe says "Edgington's argument is clearly question-begging" (p. 608). It may beg some question, but not any that I was addressing. I was showing that this was an unacceptable reading of the extant notion of conditional probability. 
Lowe on the standard definition
Lowe has two objections to the "standard definition" of conditional probability ((1) above, read as a definition of the left-hand side), the orthographic-accident complaint, and the dimensionality complaint. Each is addressed to each of two readings of "degree of belief in B given/}": (a) it is a degree of belief in a conditional proposition, "B if A"; (b) it is a degree of conditional belief in B, under the hypothesis that A. These two readings are not on a par, and were not obviously incompatible. The second is central, obligatory if probability theory, including the notion of conditional probability, applies to partial belief. It was not known, before Lewis's proof (1976) , that it precluded the first. Stalnaker (1968) adopted 2 Given Lowe's own view, revealed in §4 of his paper, I recognise that he might have been, temporarily, puzzled: what does she mean when she discusses (e.g.) being more or less certain that he will recover if he has the operation? The less theoretically committed will not, I think, find a worrying syntactic ambiguity in examples like this.
3 It is not clear that it begs the question that Lowe thinks I'm addressing: on any account of conditional probability, we should want p(A given A) = \,p(A given -'A) = 0. Lowe says "we are perfectly at liberty to define 'The conditional probability of A given A is x' as meaning 'If A (is true), then the probability of A = x' [and allow that x need not be 1]" (p. 608). Of course, in the sense that you can choose to mean anything you like by your words-but what is the point of this definition?
Ramsey's idea of adding A hypothetically to your stock of beliefs, and assessing B on the basis of this hypothesis. He then asked what truth conditions (if any) of a conditional proposition would fit this mode of assessment-which truth conditions are such that one would believe that they obtain, just to the extent that one would believe B on the hypothesis that A1 First I shall answer Lowe's orthographic-accident complaint, qua complaint about the second, conditional-belief interpretation of conditional probability:
4 and its variants bears a merely orthographic relationship to "p" in "p()": ... the meaning of "conditional probability" has been left entirely undetermined ... those who think otherwise need to explain in what sense such a ratio is a probability, (p. 606, emphasis original) (This is the mild version. On the previous page (p. 605) are accusations: of "orthographic sleight of hand"; that "probability" in "conditional probability" has (on this definition) no more significance than "rat" in "Socrates"; that "it's just a cheat to assume that we are talking about the same thing"; that "conditional probability" is, or seems, "an oxymoron".)
The question Lowe raises-when asked as a straight question-is a fair one, and it has a straight answer. Let us use the notation "p A (B)" for "the probability of B given A". Take any law of probability, any consequence of the axioms of probability theory, e.g.:/?(-.
Add the standard definition of conditional probability, and we can prove a parallel law: (B&C) , etc. The probability of B given A, on the standard definition, deserves a name which contains the word "probability" because, if p() is a probability function in which p(A) * 0, then p A () [or: p( \A) ] is a probability function, according to the axioms.
It deserves also a name containing the phrase "given A", because it relates to the probability function p{ ) as follows. Start with p( ). Now assign zero probability to all the possibilities in which -A is true-assign probability 1 to A; keep the relative probabilities of the possibilities in which A is true the same as before; and you havep A ( ).
Suppose p() represents your actual distribution of degrees of belief over some possibilities, including the possibility that A. Now assume A: hypothetically eliminate all the -^-possibilities, and keep the relative values of the remaining possibilities the same as before; p A () represents your hypothetical distribution of degrees of belief--the hypothesis being that . 4 is true (Edgington 1995, pp. 
263-4).
Compare: in Newtonian physics one might meet "Kinetic energy = , , rnv2". It is a fair question why the quantity on the right-hand side deserves any name at all, let alone the name of a kind of energy. It is a question which is answered in terms of the role this quantity plays in the theory. (It is worth remembering that probability theory had been a going concern for a century or two before Kolmogorov came along and helpfully axiomatized it. Axiomatizations are not the life-blood of a theory. Their "definitions" have to fit pre-axiomatic working concepts.)
Against the first, "probability of a conditional proposition" reading of "the conditional probability of B given A", Lowe's orthographic-accident point would be well taken, if it applied to anyone. Nobody, to my knowledge, assumed, by "orthographic sleight of hand", the existence of a proposition A*B the probability of whose truth always equals p(A&B)/p(A). Stalnaker, after honest toil, thought that he had discovered such a proposition. It turned out that he was mistaken.
I turn to Lowe's complaint about dimensionality. The ratio of two lengths is a number, not a length-the ratio has no units, whereas length does.5 How can the ratio of two probabilities be a probability? Or even a conditional probability? The point is meant to apply to both readings (p. 606). I shall show that it is ineffective against the "belief in a conditional proposition" interpretation, and afortiori, against the conditional-belief interpretation. Lowe complains, then, that we are "forced to the odd conclusion that a ratio between two degrees of belief is itself a degree of belief' (p. 607).
To eliminate one possible wony: the emphasis, in "degree(s) of belief' as it occurs in the last sentence, should be on "degree" rather than "belief '; I don't know what it would mean to divide one beliefby another. The answer to the question about dimensionality is that probabilities don't His example of temperature (p. 605) is not the happiest: on the scales we normally use, the zero is arbitrary and "twice as hot as" has no non-arbitrary rneaning. (Kelvin discovered that there is an "absolute zero" temperature; on a scale using it, no place on earth is twice as hot in summer as in winter.) have dimensions: they are just numbers. They are already ratios: your degree of belief in a proposition^, is measured by the proportion it bears to your degree of belief in a certainty-"I am 95% certain that A". (It is a convention that we choose 1 and 0 for the endpoints of the interval in which probabilities fall-for certainty that A, and for certainty that it is false that A-but it is the simplest convention, and it is built into our theory.) Consider the representation of probabilities by the Venn Diagram above. Say the actual area of the whole rectangle is 10 square centimetres, and the area which represents the probability of A, 3 square centimetres. This represents the probability of/1 as being 3 sq. cms/10 sq. cms, or 0.3. (Note also that analogously, p A (B), i.e. p(A&B)/p(A), is represented by the proportion of the area which represents^, in which B is also true.) As well as the spatial metaphor, we use the metaphor of attaching weights to possibilities: the probability of A is the weight attached to the possibilities in which A is true, divided by the total amount of weight which is distributed; the probability of B given A is that proportion of the weight attached \oA which goes (as well) to B.
Certainly, a ratio of degrees of belief is not always a degree of beliefit might not be a candidate, it might be greater than 1. (Note, though, that the ratio we are interested in, p(A&B)/p(A), is never greater than 1.) Likewise, the sum of two degrees of belief might be greater than 1, and hence not a candidate for being a degree of belief, yet we know that sometimes, the sum of two degrees of belief is a degree of belief, and sometimes it is a law that this is so: if A and B are incompatible, p(AvB) = p{A) + p{B). Similarly for ratios: sometimes, per accidens, there will be true instances of the formp(C) = p(B)/p(A); and there is an important general case where this is so. Let A and B be independent: whether one is true has no bearing on how likely it is that the other is true. In this case, p{A&.
E) -p{A) x p(B); so p(A) = p(A&B)/p(B). (For instance let
A and B be propositions about the outcomes of the next two tosses of a coin.) Hence, there is no intrinsic absurdity in the idea that a ratio of degrees of belief is a degree of belief. Hence it was a non-trivial question whether we can find a conditional proposition A*B such that, as a law, in all probability distributions,p(A*B) = p A (B). Interested parties were surprised when Lewis showed that we can't. Research continues on how close we can get; and also on whether, by varying Lewis's assumptions, we may avoid the negative result.
One further point: I agree with Lowe (pp. 606-7) that it is artificial and unhelpful to treat all probabilities as conditional, by defining p(A) as p(A given T), where Tis a tautology. But doing so would not have the dire consequence for me that he claims-that nothing we assert is ever true. Whether we definep{A) this way or not, we still have a demonstrably correct equation. In the special case where A is a tautology, &r\&p{A) = 1 in all probability distributions, no argument by Lewis, me, or anyone else tells against saying p(B given A) is the probability that B is true.
Lowe s definition of conditional probability
Lowe proposes the following definition of "one's degree of belief that B given A": (3) it is the degree of belief which one has/would have that B, if one is/were certain that A.
Part of his rationale for (3) is its connection with the principle that one should change one's beliefs by "conditionalization" (p. 609). Now, after rejecting (2) (see p. 619 above), I rejected (3), saying it "is typically correct, but not invariably so" (1995, p. 269), and gave an instance of a wellknown style of counterexample (p. 270). Let B entail "I will never discover that A"; B might be "no one alive today will ever discover that A". There are countless propositions whose truth value we are unlikely to discover. For instance, let A be "There was a chaffinch on this lawn a hundred years ago today". On the assumption that ,4 is true, it is very likely that (B) no one alive today will discover that it is true. I have a high degree of belief in B given A. But if I were to become certain that ,4 (e.g. by finding in the loft a bird-watcher's diary which inspired total confidence), I would not have a high degree of belief that B-that no one will discover that A.
Lowe considers one example of this type (p. 610): let ^ be "The CIA are bugging my office" and B be "I won't find out that the CIA are bugging my office". He claims that this "doesn't really constitute a counterexample to the claim at issue"; that the supposed counterexample depends on an "epistemically irrelevant indexical (first-person) characterization of the belief in question"; that "if I were to know for sure that the CIA were bugging some ordinary citizen's office, I would indeed have a high degree of belief that that citizen wouldn't know about it-even if that citizen happened to be myself (p. 610, emphasis original). The last claim is correct but irrelevant. Lowe doesn't explain why the fact that the putative counterexample is first-person-a belief about oneself-is an epistemically irrelevant fact about it. Even if he could, he would be left with countless other counterexamples with consequents like "no one will ever find out": all we need, to construct one, is a proposition whose truth value is unlikely to be discovered. These counterexamples stand against Lowe's proposed definition.
In order to see that they are not, pace Lowe (pp. 609-10), counterexamples to the principle that beliefs should change by conditionalization, it will be helpful to consider a simpler counterexample to Lowe's definition. I am about to pick a card and look at it. I know that there are three kings in the pile, one black and two red. My degree of belief that the card I pick will be red, given that I pick a king, is 2 / 3 . But if I discover that I have picked a king, I won't have a degree of belief of 2 / 3 that it is a red card, but a degree of belief of 1 or 0 (or near enough) that it is a red card: I am not colour blind.
Counterexamples to the principle of conditionalization would be ten a penny, were it the foolhardy recommendation that always, on learning/!, you make your new p(B) equal to your old p(B given A). In fact, it recommends this only if A is all that you presently learn which is relevant to B. When I learn that the card I pick is a king, I also learn its colour, which is relevant (to say the least) to whether it is red. Now return to the earlier examples. Typically, when you learn that A, you also learn that you have learned that A. For many 5s, this extra fact is irrelevant to B. But when B is, or entails, "I'll never find out that A", you have learned something else which is relevant-namely, that you have found out that A-and that makes conditionalization on A inapplicable (see Lewis 1986, p. 155-6) . Should Lowe's definition be amended, then, to: "Your degree of belief that B given A is the degree of belief you would/will have that B if you became certain that ,4 and learned nothing else of relevance"? No. Further difficulties remain.
Conditionalization is a normative principle. People do not always behave in accordance with it. Mary may be such that, were she to learn that her daughter was seriously ill, she would acquire a fervent belief in God. That does not mean that she now has a high conditional degree of belief in God's existence, on the assumption that her daughter is seriously ill. Ramsey realised this, warning that one's degree of belief in B given A "is not the same as the degree to which [ (1926, p. 180) . Even as a normative principle, conditionalization is a ceteris paribus one. I may come to think that my previous p(B given A) was the result of a mis-assessment of the evidence. Having learned A, I will not revise in accordance with my previous p(B given A), which I now judge to be misguided.
Another difficulty for Lowe's definition: some philosophers believe that beings with our capacities, in a world like ours, seldom or never have the right to strict certainty, at least about contingent matters. Even if we do not eschew certainty in general, the attitude is correct for some propositions, e.g. scientific generalizations, including statistical ones. Of course we can assume that such a proposition is true, and consider the consequences of the assumption for our other beliefs. Doing so is integral to empirical reasoning. Now according to Lowe, doing so is assessing what you would believe if you were certain of the hypothesis in question. Taking this counterfactual seriously involves considering counterfactual situations in which you are irrationally certain, or have super-human powers, or live in an epistemically transparent world. Such counterfactuals would be hard to assess. Fortunately, they are irrelevant to hypothetical reasoning. (Richard Jeffrey (1965) developed a generalized form of conditionalization which is compatible with the thought that certainty is unobtainable. It employs the notion of conditional probability. This would be strange if a judgment of conditional probability were itself a counterfactual about certainty.)
I conclude that Lowe's definition is inadequate, and beyond repair. Therefore his charge, that it makes an attempt to explain conditional judgements in terms of conditional probability worthless because circular, need not be considered.
A brief comment on this sentence of Lowe's: "Nor is it plausible to suppose that the notion of conditional probability is just primitive, standing in no need of definition or explication (pace Edgington 1995, p. 270)" (p. 611, emphasis original). Immediately after giving reasons for rejecting (2) and (3) above, I wrote (p. 270) '"The probability that (your degree of belief in) B on the supposition that A 'is intelligible as it stands: these further attempts to gloss it are unsuccessful and unnecessary". The remark comes after some eight pages of attempted explanation of the notion-no doubt unnecessary for those who already grasp it, insufficient for those who do not, but, I had hoped, of some value to the latter. I was reiterating that the notion of a. supposition is central to conditional probability--as it is, in my view, to conditional judgements.
Lowe on lotteries
Lowe uses examples of lotteries in an attempt to show that having a high degree of belief that B given A, and having a high degree of belief that if A, B, are not the same thing (pp. 611-13). Assume commonplace desires for winnings (no relevant desires to support charity etc.). My choice is between buying one ticket and none. Suppose I am close to certain that if I buy a ticket I will lose. Lowe says this should deter me from buying a ticket. I reply, not necessarily: the possible gain from winning may sufficiently outweigh the probable loss. If there are 100 tickets, priced £1, and one prize worth £1000,1 might well buy a ticket. Although I am close to certain that I won't win if I buy one, the risk is worth taking. Were I certain that I won't win if I buy a ticket, I wouldn't buy a ticket. If I took myself to know that I won't win if I buy a ticket, I wouldn't buy a ticket. But these cases are not under consideration.
Considering this obvious objection, Lowe switches to a second lottery with a large chance of winning a small amount. Knowing the odds, I'm, say, 99% certain that I will end up winning £1, if I purchase a ticket for £1.1 buy a ticket. "By the same token", says Lowe, concerning the original, ordinary lottery, "If one has an equally strong belief that one will lose a similar amount if one plays, this should suffice to induce one not to play" (p. 612, emphasis original). But in the second lottery, if one doesn't win, one loses £1; in the first lottery, if one doesn't lose, one wins a fortune. This is not the same token at all! Lowe's claim that people don't believe that if they buy a ticket they will lose, could gain some plausibility if we were using "believe" in its all-ornothing sense, abstracting from degrees. The mapping of belief-simpliciter onto degrees of closeness to certainty (what Ramsey called "degrees of belief") is both context-dependent and vague. One use of "believe"-simpliciter in epistemology is for "take yourself to know". I don't take myself to know that if I buy a ticket I will lose. In that sense, I don't believe that if I buy a ticket I will lose.
Lowe cannot trade on this sense of "believe" in which it is plausible that I don't believe "If I buy a ticket I will lose". It doesn't help his case. His aim is to show that conditional degrees of belief and degrees of belief in conditionals don't coincide. According to him, although you don't have a high degree of belief in the conditional "If I buy a ticket, I will lose", you do have a high conditional degree of belief that you will lose, given that you buy a ticket. On his account of the latter, this means that if you become certain that you have bought a ticket, you then have a high degree of belief that you will lose. But anything which makes it plausible that in some sense of belief-simpliciter, you don't believe the conditional "If I buy a ticket I will lose", makes it equally plausible that, having (knowingly) bought the ticket, you don't believe that you will lose.
Lowe's reason for denying that you believe the conditional is this: "If I buy a ticket, I won't win" and "If I buy a ticket, I may win" are, he claims, mutually contradictory. We all agree that if you buy a ticket, you may win. If Lowe is right, not only do you not believe that if you buy a ticket, you won't win; you disbelieve it as strongly as possible-you have zero degree of belief that if you buy a ticket, you won't win. "In confirmation" (pp. 612-3) he observes that if Xsays "If you buy, you won't win" and Y says "Yes I may-somebody has to win and it could be me", Yis disagreeing with X. However, even if we allow that they are in some sense disagreeing, this does not show that their assertions are incompatible. Compare. X: "It's going to rain". Y. "It may not". Kcan be interpreted as expressing disagreement with X, tantamount to "I wouldn't be so sure". But they do not contradict each other. Both may be correct. }"s remark is correct if the chance of rain is (sufficiently) less than 1. This does not prevent X's remark from being true. Again, consider the case where Y has already bought his ticket. X: "You won't win". Y. "I may win-somebody has got to win and it could be me". There is no contradiction between Xs and Vs remarks: that Vs is clearly correct does not show that X's is wrong. Hence, I do not see that Lowe has an argument that, when Xs and Vs last remarks are prefaced by "If you (I) buy a ticket", they are contradictory.
Turning from lotteries to coin tossing, Lowe writes:
Suppose I assert, with complete and justifiable conviction, "If you spin the coin, it will land heads". That would be an appropriate thing to assert if I knew for sure that the coin was a two-headed one, or otherwise heavily biased towards heads. Suppose then that I knew to the contrary that the coin was perfectly fair: in this case I surely ought to deny what I previously asserted, and with just as much conviction, (p. 613, emphasis original)
Lacking grounds for asserting something is not the same as having grounds for denying it. Suppose the coin has already been tossed, but I have no direct knowledge of how it landed. If I know it is double-headed or heavily biased, I assert with complete and justifiable conviction "It landed heads". If to the contrary, I know that it is perfectly fair, I do not deny what I previously asserted: I do not assert "It didn't land heads"-I just don't know how it landed. Suppose I assert with complete and justifiable conviction that the top card is red-I just saw it. In the case where I haven't seen it, I don't deny what I previously asserted-I don't say that it isn't red. Lowe's claim that "If A, it may be the case that -<5" is sufficient for complete rejection of "If A, it will be the case that B" means that conditionals make very strong claims indeed. Consider a dog which almost always, but not quite always, attacks and bites when strangers approach. (Either there is a touch of indeterminism at work, or it depends in some undetectably subtle way on the manner in which you approach it.) Lowe tells me in good faith "the probability is zero that if you approach, you will be bitten". I approach. I am bitten. "But you said ...", I protest. Lowe is unrepentant: he was quite right, he says, to deny the conditional "If you approach, you will be bitten"-for there was a small chance that you would not be bitten, which was enough to legitimate "If you approach, you may not be bitten" which is enough to refute "If you approach, you will be bitten".
I don't think we use conditionals as Lowe's theory has it. That is an empirical question. Another question is whether we should. It could well be the case that our world is sufficiently chancy that all ordinary contin-gent conditionals are false, on Lowe's theory. Even if our world is deterministic, far too many will be false. Consider again "If you approach, you will be bitten". Suppose the world is deterministic, and this time I don't approach. The antecedent, "If you approach", is silent on the manner of approach. There is no way of inferring the exact manner in which I would have approached, had I done so, from the past and the laws: from the past and the laws, in a deterministic world, you can infer that I do not approach. It may be that in 99.9% of "close" worlds in which I approach, I am bitten. For Lowe, this leaves the conditional false. For me, I am justified in being 99.9% certain that if I approach, I will be bitten. My way, I submit, fits better the use we make of conditionals in our daily lives, and their importance to us in inference and explanation.
Lastly, a comment prompted by Lowe's remark that "conditional beliefs are no more beliefs than conditional assertions are assertions" (p. 604). No more, I agree, but no less: is a conditional bet not a bet, a conditional offer not an offer? If you ask a prospective student whether she has had any offers of a university place, and she replies "Yes, I've had three conditional offers", is this incorrect? Should she have said "No (but I've had three conditional offers)"? This boring question could be decided either way, but there is a point behind it: there is a large variety of speech acts which can be performed unconditionally, or conditionally upon something else. There is a large variety of propositional attitudes which can be taken simpliciter, or under a supposition. Phrases of the form "conditional X" are products of the concept Xand the concept of conditionality. I advocate a uniform account of the role of an "if'-clause across the board: "if he phones" has the same meaning whether it is followed by a statement, a command, a question, an expression of desire, etc. I show that rival theories do not accommodate this fact (1995, pp. 287-91, p. 302) . It is not so much that conditionals are intimately connected with probability, but that belief-or perhaps better, an analogue of belief which comes in degrees, degree of closeness to certainty--is so connected. In probability theory we find at hand a notion of conditional probability, which in its epistemic application yields degrees of conditional belief, or better, degree of closeness to conditional certainty. As it happens, probability theory was the place where the concept of conditionality was first put to good work. 
Department of Philosophy

